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Introduction 
This chapter concerns a question more pressing than we wish it were: how should institutions 
and individuals react to sexual assault allegations that haven’t been established in legal 
settings? For example, if student A accuses student B of sexual assault, but doesn’t make a 
report to law enforcement, what formal university responses might be appropriate? (Should B be 
barred from campus parties? Or expelled? What kinds of accommodations to A are 
appropriate?) 
In general, the question of what to do in a given circumstance has a lot to do with epistemology. 
The right action depends on the reasons one has available, and the availability of reasons is an 
epistemic matter. On one widespread approach, it’s a matter of knowledge.2 If you know that a 
student is a rapist, you are in a very different practical situation than you’re in if you don’t. 
One tempting idea about our central question is that institutions and individuals should be 
deferential to law enforcement, effectively outsourcing the epistemology to the criminal justice 
system. For example, this line of thought has it that a university should take care to be neutral 
as to the truth of any allegation, unless and until the law enforcement process delivers its 
verdict. If a student is convicted of sexual assault in a fair criminal trial, a university should treat 
it as settled that the student is guilty of sexual assault, and react accordingly. But unless and 
until that happens, the university should do nothing.3 
                                                
1 Authors contributed equally; names are listed alphabetically. 
2 Central views in this tradition include Hawthorne & Stanley (2008), Fantl & McGrath (2009), and 
Weatherson (2012). Ichikawa (2017), pp. 139–42 defends the centrality of knowledge in action in terms of 
reasons. We work in the knowledge framework in this paper, although much of what we want to say is 
translatable into competing frameworks relating between epistemology and action. For example, if one 
thinks that all of one’s justified beliefs are among one’s practical reasons, a central question will be 
whether, in the kinds of cases we will go on to discuss, one justifiably believes that a sexual assault 
occurred. The considerations regarding rape culture, skepticism, and status quo biases we’ll go on to 
discuss seem equally applicable in that framework; the considerations regarding contextualism might or 
might not be similarly applicable. (Cohen (1999) and Wedgwood (2008) defend the context-sensitivity of 
justification ascriptions.) So while we are working within a particular, admittedly controversial, framework, 
we hope that the interest of our project will extend to theorists in competing traditions. 
3 There are stronger and weaker forms of deference one might adopt. One might defer to law 
enforcement only in those cases in which the matter is being adjudicated legally; but proponents of the 
deferential stance often hold that one should suspend judgment even if the question has never been 
legally adjudicated. 
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We think such temptation to deference is a powerful social meme, although it does not tend to 
be endorsed explicitly by university officials. One simple reason for this is that in many 
jurisdictions, the law directly prohibits this kind of deference. Since 1980 in the United States, for 
example, Title IX has required universities to have sexual harassment and assault policies 
beyond simple reference to law enforcement, on the grounds that sexual violence is a kind of 
gender discrimination.4 In Canada, Ontario and British Columbia instituted mandatory sexual 
assault policies for universities in 2017. 
When students report sexual assaults by university members to their universities, the 
allegations are typically investigated by a university process separate from law enforcement. If 
university investigatory committees conclude that the allegations are true, they may take actions 
on this basis—firing, expelling, or otherwise disciplining the person found to have committed 
assault, for example. One common complaint about this kind of action is that it is insufficiently 
deferential; it amounts to “taking the law into their own hands”, or, in cases in which legal 
proceedings are initiated but no conviction is reached, “putting their judgment over the law”. We 
think the temptation to deference is influential, even among university administrators; certainly it 
is influential among the wider population. (You can find expressions of this deferential attitude 
near the top of every list of comments on news articles about university sexual assault policies.) 
We’ll argue that this sort of deference is mistaken, for at least two kinds of reasons. One is that, 
as anti-rape activists have often emphasized, law enforcement procedures themselves are 
deeply flawed when it comes to their practice of dealing with sexual assault. Another has to do 
with the connections between knowledge and action, and between knowledge and knowledge 
ascriptions. We also think that these disparate considerations are more closely interconnected 
than it may at first appear. 
We’ll begin in §1 with a discussion of some of the challenges to adequate law enforcement 
response to sexual assault, including the operation of sometimes-transparent social and political 
factors that constitute rape culture. In §2 we begin to foreground more explicit epistemological 
questions, focusing on the interaction of rape culture with the epistemology of testimony. §§3–4 
take up the relationship between epistemology, practical reasoning, and action, explaining how 
skeptical pressure motivates a conservatism that benefits the status quo. We’ll introduce, in §5, 
contextualism about knowledge ascriptions as a solution to some of the challenges that have 
emerged, and offer a further criticism of many deferential stances; in §6 we’ll show how many of 
the social and political challenges discussed early in the paper recur with respect to 
metasemantic considerations. 
§1 Rape Culture and Law Enforcement 
Epistemic deference to law enforcement makes sense only to the degree to which law 
enforcement’s epistemic procedures are reliable.5 So the idea that institutions and individuals 
                                                
4 For some legal discussion see Curtis 2017 and Johnson 2017. 
5 There are also important non-epistemic grounds for not deferring to law enforcement. For example, one 
might have political motivations for questioning the legitimacy of police and legal systems as authorities 
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should so defer rests on particular assumptions about the contexts in which sexual assault and 
assault allegations occur, and about the formal and informal channels of justice in place to deal 
with them. Articulating these assumptions, and clarifying certain relevant features of the social 
and political context, will allow us to show how they are bound up with harmful epistemic 
idealizations. 
When institutions or individuals defer to the investigative and procedural standards of police and 
the law, this bespeaks a high degree of confidence in these standards and procedures. We 
think such confidence betrays an ignorance of the social and political context in which sexual 
assault occurs, in which victims testify about their experience (formally and informally), and in 
which individuals, institutions, police, and the law respond to said testimony. For example, 
cultural attitudes surrounding sexual assault, women’s credibility,6 and of patriarchal and 
misogynist presumptions of access and entitlement to women’s bodies are significant 
determinants in how juries rule in sexual assault cases. These issues also have a lot to do with 
whether or not sexual assault is ever disclosed or reported.7 
These social and political factors are sometimes theorized as elements of rape culture—a 
cultural environment where sexual assault and sexualized violence is a normative or expected 
type of interaction.8 This account demands that analysis of sexualized violence (and dominant 
understandings thereof) occur with an eye to the cultural and political factors that entrench and 
reproduce it, including spurious beliefs about race, gender, and sexuality. Rape culture is 
therefore visible not only in the statistics of reported sexual assault, but also in the cultural 
discourse that produces these statistics and other undisclosed experiences, and conditions 
responses to allegations of sexual assault.9  
Importantly, patriarchal and misogynist values work in tandem with many other oppressive 
hierarchical systems in producing the social conditions structuring rape culture. Colonialism, 
racism, homophobia, ableism, and classism produce populations who are often especially 
vulnerable to sexualized violence. For example, racist stereotypes and the structural oppression 
faced by women of colour work in tandem to render this demographic at high risk for sexual 
                                                                                                                                                       
and instruments of justice. One could, for example, explain politically motivated non-deference in terms of  
both the lack of reliability exhibited in the epistemic procedures of law enforcement as well as the 
historical and contemporary violence enacted by the state in the protection of certain interests. Though 
we lack the space to explore these reasons in-depth, we seem them as part of a continuum with the 
epistemic reasons we examine throughout. 
6 Women are not the only demographic who experience sexualized violence, but the cultural attitudes that 
produce such things involve an ideology that is deeply gendered. Here, we will speak of “women” not only 
as the demographic category that experiences the highest rates of sexual assault, but also as an 
ideological category with built-in patriarchal baggage that renders it particularly susceptible to some of the 
political and epistemic problems discussed here. In cases where non-women experience and disclose 
their experiences of sexual assault, the widespread association of their experiences with typically 
feminine ones (and the even scarcer hermeneutical resources available to them) constitutes part of the 
difficult social situation that they face, both in terms of disclosing and being believed.  
7 Anderson (2003), George et al (1992); Koss (1985); McAusland (1998).  
8 Brownmiller (1975), Hampton (1999).  
9 Buchwald et al (2005), Burt (1980). 
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assault, and likely to experience difficulties in reporting their experiences.10 These vulnerabilities 
are compounded when, for example, the women in question are refugees, asylum seekers, or 
immigrants,11 if they do not have stable access to housing,12 or if they have disabilities.13 
One reason we are less optimistic about the ability of the law to deal with infractions stemming 
from patriarchy and misogyny has to do with the political and ideological affiliations of legal 
systems themselves. We think deferential attitudes mistakenly assume that no such affiliations 
exist. This vision rests on an idealized (and often unarticulated) account of the relationship 
between law and the cultural context in which it is embedded—one which many critical legal 
theorists have sought to bring to light. They argue that, often, liberal democratic institutions not 
only permit but also conceal and reify the subordination of women under the guise of formal 
neutrality. In Towards a Feminist Theory of the State, Catherine MacKinnon suggests that 
inasmuch as the state and its institutions are constituted in a cultural context, they will tend to 
reflect that culture. This means that, for example, a patriarchal culture is apt to yield and 
mutually reinforce a patriarchal state. According to MacKinnon, “women are oppressed socially, 
prior to law, without express state acts, often in intimate contexts,”14 and therefore states and 
institutions that are committed to negative freedom and judicial neutrality—and that see 
themselves as socially transcendent rather than embedded—will not be able to address 
injustices that arise from this configuration. 
Attempts are increasingly being made to update laws and procedures surrounding sexual 
assault—the criminalization of sexual assault within marriage, for example,15 or the slow 
phasing out of the requirement of corroboration of sexual assault by witnesses.16 Although these 
developments reflect important cultural milestones, and doubtless improve the lives of many, 
there is still ample evidence17 and theoretical work on the ways in which the law and rape 
culture continue to co-operate. This situation arises from, and is compounded by, abstractions in 
law and in our conceptual analysis. 
Epistemologists, critical legal theorists, and other scholars are increasingly attentive to how 
power, ideology, and oppressive cultural conditions affect theorizing, and to how the 
idealizations they employ sometimes abstract away from highly relevant contextual factors. 
Charles Mills’s work is a central case in point. In his work on ignorance and idealization in 
philosophical theorizing, Mills emphasizes the gap between oppressive social conditions and 
                                                
10 Foley et al (1995), Donovan and Williams (2002), George and Martínez (2016). 
11 Hynes and Lopes (2000), Ward and Vann (2002), Wenzel et al (2004).  
12 Kushel et al (2003), Tyler et al (2010). 
13 Khalifeh et al (2015), Basile (2015). 
14 Mackinnon, 1989: 165. 
15 In Canada, in 1983 with the update of Bill C-127, and in 1993 in all fifty of the United States. 
16 In the 1980s and 1990s in North America. See Tang (1998). 
17 For example, in statistics on untested evidence kits and underreporting in the United States— see 
Ritter (2011) and Rennison (2002).  
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theoretical idealizations, writing that “abstracting away from realities crucial to our 
comprehension of the actual workings of injustice in human interactions and social institutions”18  
provides little practical directives for the achievement of social justice, and, moreover, often 
obscures the existence of the very conditions that exacerbate injustices—like, for example, 
sexism and racism. Ultimately, Mills argues that this precludes achievement of the ideal-as-
idealized model, leading to situations in which theoretical idealizations serve to bolster the social 
and political status quo, and are employed, at least in part, for this reason. 
MacKinnon’s work is focused on a similar gap: namely, the one assumed between the private 
and public sphere, and, more generally, between what is deemed to be amenable to 
politicization and legal treatment, and what is not. MacKinnon and Mills focus on political 
philosophy, but their arguments apply equally to theorizing in epistemology, as we will show. 
§2 Knowledge and Testimony 
Law is not the only domain implicated in this kind of deferral of epistemic responsibility: folk-
conceptions (and double-standards) regarding the relationship between knowledge and 
testimony are also significant. Our epistemic reactions to testimony are heavily influenced by 
many cultural and political factors. Often we take testimony as, for all relevant purposes, 
conclusive for its contents. If you tell your friends where you went for dinner last night, they will 
probably take that as settling the question, even if there is something riding on it—if it would 
settle a bet, for instance. 
It is, of course, possible to raise skeptical challenges to such cases: you might be lying. In cases 
in which we are wholly reliant on someone’s testimony, the possibility that they are not telling 
the truth does constitute a skeptical scenario—it’s a way that things could be that your evidence 
doesn’t, in some strict sense, rule out.19 But we do not always treat the possibility of skeptical 
scenarios as undermining knowledge. In at least a wide variety of cases, our orientation toward 
testimony is a non-skeptical one: when someone tells us that P, we end up justified in believing 
that P. And ordinarily, if the speaker knows that P and tells us that P, we end up ourselves 
knowing that P. That testimonial knowledge is common is both commonsense and philosophical 
orthodoxy.20 
But we do not always take this kind of stance. Sometimes we interrogate testimony; sometimes 
we explain it away or demand proof. As much recent literature in both social psychology21 and 
epistemic injustice22 has shown, social and cultural factors influence the degree to which 
testimony is considered credible. The identity of both speaker and hearer, as well as the content 
being conveyed, influence the reception of testimony at the individual and broader cultural level. 
                                                
18 Mills (2005), p. 170. 
19 Lewis (1996), p. 553, lays out this way of thinking of skeptical scenarios. 
20 See e.g. Lackey (2008) or Adler (2015) for the philosophical canon. 
21 Frohmann, (1991); Mack, (1993); Mulder et al (1996); George et al (2016), Snyder et al (1977).  
22 Alcoff (2000); Jones (2002); Fricker (2007). 
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Testimony that conveys a personal experience of sexual assault—especially in cases in which 
no one other than those involved in the interaction have firsthand knowledge of what occurred—
is often met with skepticism. In other words, a different epistemic standard is employed in these 
cases that is not present in the reception of other kinds of testimony.   
Furthermore, the determination of whether or not the testimony of the individual alleging assault 
counts as knowledge is frequently cast in terms of measuring the reliability of two people 
against each other, without regard for important contextual features. This is a mistake, because 
some of those contextual features might incline members of the community, juries, and police to 
assume that one individual is much more reliable than the other, for reasons having to do with 
stereotypes and structural power. This is visible in what, in highly publicized controversies 
regarding sexual assault, is submitted as evidence that might decrease the reliability of the 
individual who is testifying that they were assaulted: their past sexual behaviour, their choice of 
clothing, their friends, their hobbies, etc. 
Leigh Gilmore addresses this in her discussion of Anita Hill’s testimony in the Clarence Thomas 
confirmation hearings: 
Common notions like "Nobody knows what really happened" and "It's a case of he 
said/she said" deflect inquiry into what we might come to know and even what we 
already do know. Moreover, they participate in narrowing attention to the immediate time 
frame of crisis or scandal, restricting the frame temporally, and ensuring that no 
adequate context for understanding will emerge. For these reasons, Toni Morrison's 
comment on the hearing provides pivotal guidance: ‘For insight into the complicated and 
complicating events that the confirmation of Clarence Thomas became, one needs 
perspective, not attitudes; contexts, not anecdotes; analyses, not postures. For any kind 
of lasting illumination, the focus must be on the history routinely ignored or played down 
or unknown.'23 
When individuals testify that they were sexually assaulted, their testimony is often considered to 
be less reliable than most testimony. It is often suggested that they are either lying—out of 
animus, or to seek attention, or because the 'survivor' identity is socially valuable—or deluded. 
Psychological discourse surrounding the harms of sexual assault often unwittingly contribute to 
rendering those who testify about their experience unreliable in the eyes of their audience. For 
example, in her book on the politics of sexualized violence, Alison Healicon notes that 
therapeutic articulations of the category of “rape victim” inhibit the effective communication of 
the experience, as individuals belonging to this category are understood to have a damaged 
grasp on reality.24 A “credibility conundrum” ensues25: if, according to the available 
hermeneutics, the trauma of sexual assault damages a potential testifier specifically in terms of 
their capacities qua testifiers, then it will be impossible for their testimony to convey knowledge. 
                                                
23 Gilmore (2017), p. 57, citing Morrison (1992), p. x. 
24 Healicon (2016). 
25 Jordan (2004). 
7 
These assumptions and idealizations constitute a part of rape culture, and are invoked 
strategically to further entrench that culture. However, they do not necessarily arise out of the ill-
will of particular individuals or communities. Following Miranda Fricker’s (2007) Foucauldian 
account of power in Epistemic Injustice, we take it that the lack of available hermeneutical 
resources for the communication and uptake of sexual assault narratives are a collective and 
structural problem, and are not necessarily withheld by particular individuals. Part of our aim in 
this chapter is to render visible the biases and automatic socio-political alignments embedded in 
fundamental epistemological concepts and assumptions. 
In sum, rape culture has acute epistemic effects. It conditions the reception of testimony that 
alleges the occurrence of a sexual assault and restricts the hermeneutical resources that 
marginalized individuals can draw on to communicate their experience. The results of this are 
visible in the difference between idealized notions of how culpability, evidence, and knowledge 
are determined in cases where sexual assault is alleged, and what actually tends to occur. 
Many social scientists have studied what happens when individuals disclose that they have 
been sexually assaulted, in a variety of informal or institutional settings. By and large, those who 
seek to communicate their experience of sexual assault tend to suffer serious social and 
emotional costs for it.26 It’s also important to note that the belief that there are hermeneutical 
and legal resources available to address such injustices are held much more readily by 
privileged groups and individuals: in a 1992 study on the disclosure of sexual assault, Gail 
Elizabeth Wyatt found white women far more likely to disclose their assaults than Black women, 
who “do not anticipate that they will be protected by traditional authorities and institutions.”27 
Furthermore, because the reasons that some individuals or communities might be adverse to 
reporting to legal or penal authorities are often not broadly understood in dominant culture, 
failure to report is often construed as indicative of the weakness of a case and the perceived 
non-credibility of the person in question, rather than institutionalized racism, classism, sexism, 
ableism, etc. 
The assumption that the testimony of people who claim to have been sexually assaulted is 
unreliable is poorly supported by the available evidence, as in fact false allegations of sexual 
assault are exceedingly rare.28 Of course, it is possible to find examples of false assault 
allegations. However, as in the more general examples discussed above, this does not 
undermine the general reliability of such reports. Indeed, it is essential to the epistemology of 
testimony generally that although sometimes testimony is misleading, it typically issues into 
knowledge. Reliability needn’t be perfect reliability. But, as we have seen, the fact that sexual 
assault narratives are often quite trustworthy does not mean that they are, in fact, trusted. 
                                                
26 Davis et al. (1991); Golding et al. (1989); Ullman (2000); Ahrens (2006); Dworkin (2016); Wyatt (1992).  
27 Wyatt, 1992: 86. 
28 Lisak et al, (2010). 
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§3 Knowledge and Action 
As alluded to in the Introduction, there are important connections between epistemology and 
practical decision-making. A prerequisite to knowing what to do is knowing how things are. One 
way to encode that relationship is via a straightforward relationship between knowledge and 
reasons for action, according to which one's reasons constitute all and only that which one 
knows.29 On this framework, to know something is to have it conclusively settled—or at least, 
conclusively enough for one’s practical purposes. If you know that P, you don’t have to worry 
about whether not-P. Conversely, if uncertainty about P renders the possibility of not-P a 
serious practical consideration, you do not know that P. 
The knowledge–reasons principle explains why skepticism and inaction are so closely 
connected. It explains, for example, why someone concerned about the possibility that an 
accused rapist is innocent will face pressure to deny knowledge of his guilt. “I know that he is 
guilty, but we shouldn’t punish him because of the chance that he is innocent” is a contradiction. 
The knowledge–reasons principle says that if something is known, it's available as a reason. If 
something is not known, then it implies that it's not a reason.30 This points to a normative 
complication of our discussion above. We have argued that unwarranted doubt, a manifestation 
of a pervasive rape culture, tends to attach to testimony about sexual assault; this often leads to 
inaction in a way that we consider an important mistake. But note that if one has doubt—even 
unwarranted patriarchal doubt—one may eo ipso fail to know. And this, given the knowledge–
reasons principle, implies that one lacks reason to act. 
Jennifer Nagel's work on “epistemic anxiety” offers an example of how these ideas might 
interact. Nagel characterizes epistemic anxiety as a kind of feeling of uncertainty; when one is 
epistemically anxious, one doesn't consider the question to be settled. It is possible to have 
epistemic anxiety even when one's evidence is conclusive; having conclusive evidence and 
feeling as if one has conclusive evidence are different states. Epistemic anxiety, Nagel says, is 
inconsistent with knowledge because it is inconsistent with (outright) belief, which is itself 
necessary for knowledge.31 
Epistemic anxiety is not automatically rational. If one is epistemically anxious, one may be 
accurately reflecting the weakness in one's epistemic position, but one might be experiencing 
                                                
29 The philosophical literature on reasons is vast, and complicated by diverse terminological choices. 
Ichikawa (2017), pp. 140–1 articulates a version of the approach we are using here, and situates it into 
broader discussions of ‘internal’ and ‘external’ reasons, and ‘possessed’ and ‘unpossessed’ reasons, and 
‘reasons’ and rationalizing action. 
30 We recognize that this is a controversial commitment (though, as the previous footnote suggests, 
identifying just which views conflict with what is not straightforward, due to diverse terminological 
choices). The broader point is uncontroversial: there is a substantial connection between epistemology 
and appropriate action. The knowledge–reasons principle is one way of articulating it. As we said at the 
start, we expect that our central points are translatable into other frameworks. 
31 See e.g. Nagel (2010). Note that the ‘belief’ condition in the classical ‘justified true belief’ theory of 
knowledge stood for a kind of full commitment, similar to certainty or being sure. Gettier (1963). See 
Ichikawa (2017), pp. 224–6 for discussion. 
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unwarranted doubt. Suppose someone doesn’t know that a sexual assault has occurred 
because of epistemic anxiety. The knowledge–reasons principle says the fact of the sexual 
assault is not among their reasons; it’s easy to argue they don’t have sufficient reason to act. 
Does this vindicate a deferential response? 
There are two strategies available to undercut this suggestion. One is to argue that epistemic 
rationality affirmatively requires belief in the cases in question. One ought not be epistemically 
anxious, because doing so is epistemically prohibited under the circumstances.32 On such a 
picture, unwarranted doubt cannot render someone’s inaction epistemically faultless. 
However, many epistemologists are skeptical of “positive” epistemic norms, and therefore do 
not take failure to believe something that one could have known to be an epistemic failure.33  
Theorists of this stripe hold that epistemology is only in the business of identifying beliefs it’s 
epistemically permissible to hold, but that there are no genuine positive epistemic norms. In our 
view, this tradition gives an unwarranted privileged place to skepticism. It holds that skepticism 
is always epistemically permissible. 
But even theorists who limit epistemic normativity to prohibitions of belief typically allow that 
other sources of normativity—moral and pragmatic norms, for example—can interact with 
epistemic norms to generate obligations to believe.34 They insist that skepticism is epistemically 
permissible, but are open to the idea that positive moral or pragmatic norms interact with 
negative epistemic ones to require belief. 
Whether or not one accepts positive epistemic norms, then, there is room to say that in some 
cases of epistemic anxiety regarding sexual assault testimony, one ought not have that anxiety, 
and one ought to believe the allegations. Skepticism is a mistake of some kind. As we have 
seen, skepticism often works in tandem with oppressive social conditions to discredit the 
knowledge claims of marginalized individuals and groups. 
Our own sympathies are in favour of positive epistemic norms; we think that in these cases, 
failure to believe is as much an epistemic error as is believing something that isn’t warranted. 
Undue epistemic anxiety is therefore on our view an epistemic error, in addition to being (in this 
case) a moral error. But whether or not one agrees with us about positive epistemic norms, one 
can agree that one should know. 
                                                
32 See e.g. Ichikawa and Jarvis (forthcoming) for an application of this line of thought in other kinds of 
cases. 
33 See e.g. Nelson (2010) and Littlejohn (2012), p. 47. 
34 For example, Nelson (2010) pp. 92–3 and Littlejohn (2012), p. 48 both allow that nonepistemic goals 
interact with epistemic restrictions on permissible belief to allow for hybrid obligations to believe. 
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§4 Pragmatic Encroachment and Epistemic 
Idealizations 
So far we have pointed to some reasons for concern about the uptake of sexual assault 
allegations—their reception is processed in an oppressive political and cultural context, where 
motivated doubt is a significant possibility. One might accept this much, however, and deny that 
such doubt is mistaken. Maybe the natural tendency towards epistemic anxiety, in the face of 
sexual assault allegations, is appropriate and justified, and deference to the legal system is the 
most appropriate cautious response. 
There is a tendency towards skepticism when the perceived importance of a question is high. 
One way to motivate the kind of skepticism and deference we are discussing, then, is to 
emphasize the high practical stakes involved in responding to sexual assault allegations. For 
example, a person might in good faith believe that the seriousness of sexual assault allegations 
indicate that they are better handled in a legal setting. We have argued that this faith is often 
misplaced: harmful idealizations obscure the relationship between law and culture, and these 
idealizations are apt to reproduce oppressive conditions under the guise of formal neutrality.  
Skeptical or deferential stances towards sexual assault allegations might also be motivated by 
the assumption that sexual assault is a “private” matter. However, the distinction between 
“public” and “private” is itself often mobilized in service of maintaining an oppressive status quo. 
For example, in The Sexual Contract, Carole Pateman argues that the traditional liberal 
distinction between the public and private sphere often situated women in the latter. 
Furthermore, this tradition assumes the private sphere to be outside the scope of legal or 
political recourse, with the effect that violence or unequal power relations in this sphere are 
naturalized and obscured.35  
In discussions of the high stakes surrounding sexual assault allegations, it is also common to 
emphasize the seriousness of the consequences for those who have been accused. This in 
effect emphasizes the risked harm of a false finding of responsibility. Perhaps, in the face of 
risks such as these, it takes a stronger evidential situation to count as knowing. This, broadly 
speaking, is the thought behind so-called ‘pragmatic encroachment’ in epistemology.36 
Pragmatic encroachment theorists hold that knowledge doesn’t just depend on “truth-relevant” 
features like one’s evidential situation, but also on practical considerations like how high the 
stakes are. In particular, the higher the stakes, the more it takes to know.37 
Applied to the present discussion, the pragmatic encroachment strategy might suggest that the 
gravity of the accusation, and its social and practical costs, are enough to raise the bar for 
knowledge. It’s harder to know about sexual assault via testimony than it is to know other things, 
                                                
35 Pateman, 1988. 
36 The term was introduced by Jon Kvanvig in a “Certain Doubts” blog post in 2004. 
37 Central defenders of pragmatic encroachment include Stanley (2004), Fantl & McGrath (2009), and 
Weatherson (2012).. See Weatherson (2017) for a sympathetic contemporary overview of the view. 
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because the stakes are higher for beliefs about sexual assault. This strategy could explain 
institutional reluctance to take action against individuals accused of sexual assault: the costs of 
being wrong are just so high. 
We are pessimistic about justifying this kind of reticence to believe via pragmatic encroachment. 
The explanation sketched assumes certain perspectives that should not be taken for granted. In 
particular, it emphasizes the risks and costs to the person accused of sexual assault, and 
ignores those for the person who testifies that they were assaulted.  
In other words, it is important to note that what one considers to be a high-stakes situation (and 
the perspective from which stakes are analyzed) is itself conditioned by ethical and epistemic 
factors flowing from the political and ideological context. It is, for example, revealing of our 
cultural and political commitments that the framing of sexual assault controversies and trials 
often highlight the harms men and boys will experience as a result of being accused or found 
guilty of sexually assaulting someone. Kate Manne has labelled this phenomenon “himpathy”.38 
Likewise, the preoccupation with the potential for false accusations (especially given their 
infrequent occurrence) demonstrates that the one group’s potential harms far outweigh the 
potential harms to another group in the cultural consciousness. Such considerations (and rape 
culture more generally) must be brought to bear when theorizing pragmatic encroachment in the 
context of responding to sexual assault allegations. 
Pragmatic encroachment is motivated by a kind of risk-aversion. The implicit model is one that 
treats suspension of judgment as the default—to make a judgment is to undergo the risk of 
being wrong. Even if the pragmatic encroachment model explicitly recommends further 
investigation rather than the suspension of judgment, we take it that attention to the non-ideal 
and socially-embedded contexts of “high-stakes” epistemic situations might in fact reveal that 
skepticism and the felt need for further investigation are very closely connected. Indeed, their 
effects are identical, especially in cases in which one’s own investigatory capacities are limited 
and the very meaning of “investigation” is steeped in  oppressive assumptions.   
In addition to motivating skeptical or deferential positions, the public/private divide also affects 
how harms and stakes are characterized. On the pragmatic encroachment mode, these 
characterizations are often dependant on longstanding cultural beliefs about sexual assault as a 
“private” matter implicating only the accuser and the accused. This stance limits the extent to 
which rape culture can be articulated as a harm at a collective or societal level, or indeed 
whether sexual assault can be understood in terms of pernicious cultural discourse rather than 
the mere ill-will or criminality of individual perpetrators. This stance also limits the extent to 
which communities and institutions can be held accountable for preventing sexual assault: doing 
nothing, whether under the guise of searching for further evidence or deferring to law 
enforcement, often implicitly condones the behaviour of those who perpetrate sexualized 
violence.  
The problems with the pragmatic encroachment model are also related to our discussion of 
negative and positive epistemic norms in §3. Ultimately, the idea that suspending judgment is 
                                                
38 Manne (2018), pp. 196–201. 
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the way to “play it safe” ignores the potential risk of failing to acquire available knowledge; 
moreover, following the injunction to “seek out further evidence” can, via selective investigation, 
provide further opportunities for one’s inquiry to tilt in favour of confirming certain (patriarchal, 
etc.) starting points.39 It assumes, in effect, that the status quo—with the subject declining to 
form a belief on the matter—is normatively acceptable. But failure to form available knowledge 
can be costly and harmful. This is true in general, but especially obvious in the case of 
testimony of sexual assault. 
Moreover, without an adequate understanding of how knowledge attributions are affected by 
rape culture, the resultant harms will be made invisible and further entrenched. This is because 
epistemic idealizations of the kind Mills discusses work in tandem with a strong bias towards the 
status quo, both in epistemology and in broader society. If pragmatic encroachment is 
understood in terms of some putatively “objective” standard of what counts as a high-stakes 
situation, it is likely that the perspective of socially dominant groups and individuals will be the 
yardsticks we employ, precisely because their perspectives are taken to be neutral. 
MacKinnon’s work on the character of law in a patriarchal society, and Mills’s account of 
ideologically-motivated idealizations are both intimately tied to this point. In effect, they caution 
that we must be wary of taking as neutral what is in fact ideologically loaded. 
Some of the intuitions that are cited to motivate pragmatic encroachment in cases like these are 
susceptible of alternate explanations along these lines. A general tendency to favour the status 
quo—reinforced by the cultural elements it favours—is part of the story.40 A self-serving bias is 
surely another. It is disruptive to believe a sexual assault allegation—especially if it is against 
someone with whom one has any kind of significant relationship. A friend of one of the authors 
has recounted a story of discussing her sexual assault with the woman married to her assailant. 
In declining to listen, the wife explicitly cited the cost that believing would bring. “If it’s as bad as 
you say,” she told her, “believing it would destroy my marriage”. Here, of course, she is citing 
the high cost of believing even if it’s true, so the pragmatic encroachment mold doesn’t fit in the 
usual way. But given the high cost of belief in general in cases like these, it’s not difficult to 
imagine a kind of motivated invocation of the high cost of being wrong. It’s easier to do nothing 
(viz, suspend judgment) and rationalize it via pragmatic encroachment.41 
Transparency regarding how cultural and ideological commitments structure our inquiry is the 
first step to a version of philosophy that addresses oppression. Explaining the phenomena 
                                                
39 Compare the parallel point about scientific evidence in Levy (2017). 
40 Hundleby (2016) suggests we teach a “status quo bias” alongside the more canonical formal and 
informal fallacies. 
41 Charles Mills develops a similar idea in his work on ignorance. In The Racial Contract, he theorizes that 
the psychic and moral conditions that made possible slavery, colonization, and the continued structural 
privileging of whiteness involve the conceptual erasure of the personhood, property, and communities of 
racialized peoples. In the cases Mills considers in The Racial Contract, as in the example of believing 
disruptive testimony regarding sexual assault, self-transparency and a genuine commitment to 
understanding social realities would interfere with the positive self-conception of individuals and 
communities in privileged epistemic and social positions. As Mills puts it, these epistemologies of 
ignorance operate as a “pattern of localized and global cognitive dysfunctions,” though they are 
“psychologically and socially functional.” (Mills, 1997: 18). 
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we’ve been investigating in terms of pragmatic encroachment must address the value-laden 
assumptions structuring that explanation. A commitment to a particular perspective (one that is 
automatically privileged in a rape culture) goes into the appeal to pragmatic encroachment to 
explain why knowledge cannot be conveyed in the cases we’re considering here, and to fail to 
render this explicit as a commitment stemming from the social context of knowledge is 
problematic for ethical and epistemic reasons. 
The project of rendering political commitments and the ideological context of knowledge explicit 
can also be seen as arising within feminist standpoint theory, especially with regard to the claim 
that the epistemic privilege of marginalized communities arises from their understanding of this 
context. For example, standpoint theory takes the occupation of a marginalized social location 
to enhance understandings of the workings of power, as marginalized people must negotiate 
both their own environments, where power and oppression are necessarily confronted, and the 
environments of the socially dominant, who have the privilege of remaining ignorant about the 
many of the features of their social world.42 It is the juxtapositioning of these environments that 
creates, for marginalized knowers, a sense that dominant accounts of the world are decidedly 
non-neutral and value-laden.  
When considering pragmatic encroachment, the workings of the legal system, and testimony as 
applied to sexual assault, scholarship on epistemic privilege, motivated ignorance, and 
idealization all help to draw out why the foundations from which we reason often have invisible 
political and social implications. As Adrienne Rich notes, in a context that privileges and 
universalizes the experience of dominant groups (in this case, men), “objectivity has been little 
more than male subjectivity.”43 Furthermore, values and political commitments are often only 
visible as such when they are different from the norm. We will expand upon this status quo bias, 
and related ideologically-motivated skepticism, in what follows. 
§5 Contextualism and Knowledge without Courtroom 
Knowledge 
We turn now to another aspect of the problem with excessive deference to law enforcement, 
declining to act on the grounds that guilt hasn’t been proven in a legal setting. In a just and 
equitable criminal system, defendants are considered innocent in light of the law unless and 
until they are proven guilty. An inevitable consequence of any such system is that some 
genuinely guilty offenders will be acquitted, because, although they are guilty, they haven’t been 
proven to be so. This is widely thought justified on the grounds that it is better for guilty people 
to walk free than it is for innocent people to be wrongly incarcerated. We accept these tenets of 
liberal democracy. 
                                                
42 Patricia Hill Collins theorizes this epistemic position in terms of the “insider-outsider,” (1990); (1991), 
this line of thought also appears in Narayan (1988). 
43 Rich (1994), p. 3. 
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Because of prosecutors’ burden of proof, it obviously does not follow from the fact that someone 
has not been convicted of some criminal offense that they did not commit that crime. The 
phrase “innocent until proven guilty” doesn’t mean that anyone literally is innocent.44 So much, 
we take it, is pretty obvious. After all, some people are guilty of crimes that no one ever found 
out about, and so were never prosecuted. But this is even true of people who have been 
acquitted, perhaps because the evidence against them was insufficient. Courts sometimes use 
the misnomer of “finding the defendant not guilty”—they might say more precisely that they did 
“not find the defendant guilty”. Some defendants are guilty of the crimes of which they were 
acquitted. They are “innocent in the eyes of the law”, but they are guilty. 
According to the thought behind the deferential stance we critique, if there wasn’t evidence 
sufficient for a criminal conviction, this typically demonstrates that we can never know whether 
someone is guilty of an offense, and so can’t responsibly take any action in response. This is 
the thought behind the suggestion that, for example, if a sexual assault finding hasn’t been 
established in court, it would be inappropriate to act on that accusation, because this would be 
putting our own judgment over that of the law. 
For the reasons outlined in §1, we do not think that, when it comes to reacting to sexual assault, 
it is always wrong to put one’s own judgment over that of the law. As enforced, the law is deeply 
flawed in many ways, including systematic ones. But we also think it’s a mistake to suppose that 
in general, acting on one’s own sexual assault finding, when there is insufficient evidence for 
criminal remedies, even amounts to putting one’s own judgment over that of the law. 
Suppose a sexual assault allegation is found insufficiently well-supported to justify legal remedy. 
From this it is very natural to infer that the evidence available was insufficient for knowledge that 
the assault occurred. If we assume that a university fact-finding procedure has access to the 
same body of evidence as law enforcement, then university fact-finders don’t have evidence 
sufficient for knowledge either. So they too ought not to act on the allegation. 
One way to resist the argument is to deny the link between knowledge and actionability. 
Another, discussed in §4, is to invoke pragmatic encroachment, suggesting that knowledge is 
possible only in the lower-stakes scenario, perhaps holding that the stakes of university findings, 
while serious, are not so weighty as those involved in legal decisions about whether someone 
ought to be convicted of a crime. We focus now on a different avenue of resistance: the 
contextualist one. 
Contextualism about knowledge ascriptions is the view that sentences containing “knows” are 
context-sensitive. Like indexicals (“I”, “now”, “that”), gradable adjectives (“humid”, “skillful”, 
“feminist”), and other terms, “knows” is susceptible to diverse semantic implementations in 
different conversational contexts.45 For example, conversations that focus on skeptical ideas 
might tend to evoke higher standards for “knows”. One influential motivation for contextualism is 
                                                
44 Article 11 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights has it that “[e]veryone charged with a penal 
offence has the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law in a public trial”. 
45 Influential early discussions of contextualism include Stine (1976), DeRose (2009), Lewis (1996), and 
Cohen (1999). 
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its ability to explain patterns of intuition of this type. Perhaps in courtroom conversational 
contexts, high epistemic standards are in operation (perhaps because of the weighty practical 
matters at stake); consequently, “we cannot know what happened” might be true in the jurors’ 
conversation. But in other contexts, even given the same evidence, when different actions are 
contemplated, “we know that a sexual assault occurred” might be true. 
Contextualism is controversial, but in our view, it has much to commend it.46 A contextualist can 
tell a simple story about differential standards for action in criminal contexts and other contexts, 
such as university action: one can count as “knowing” that someone has committed a serious 
offense in a conversation about how the university ought to respond to it, without counting as 
“knowing” it in a conversation about whether the state ought to incarcerate the perpetrator. This 
framework straightforwardly invalidates the tempting argument that, since there wasn’t evidence 
sufficient for criminal conviction, there’s no way to know what happened, so it would be 
unwarranted to act on the basis of a mere allegation. 
Here’s an example of the kind of fallacious argument we have in mind. In 2016, after the 
University of British Columbia announced a plan for John Furlong to keynote a high-profile 
university event, activists protested the invitation, citing dozens of allegations of child abuse, 
including sexual abuse, by former students from the Canadian First Nations schools where 
Furlong taught in the 1970s. UBC briefly rescinded the invitation, but quickly reversed that 
decision. UBC President Santa Ono apologized to Furlong, writing that the withdrawal was 
made “without proper consideration of its potential impact on Mr. Furlong or his family”. He 
reinstated the invitation, with this statement: 
Notwithstanding what led to the decision to cancel Mr. Furlong’s keynote address, I have 
made it my decision as president of the university to reverse course because it is simply 
the right thing to do. I decided this after better informing myself with the facts, including 
Mr. Furlong’s stellar reputation in the fields of business, leadership and sport, the diverse 
views of our many stakeholders, and, as importantly, the judicial record. The British 
Columbia Civil and Supreme Courts have ruled in favour of Mr. Furlong in every matter 
that has come before them. The university had no basis to put its judgment above 
theirs.47 
Two things are notable about this passage. First, it is a clear example of the ‘himpathy’ 
phenomenon we discussed above, in this case reflecting settler-colonial priorities in addition to 
patriarchal ones. In this example, the interests of the accused are made salient, and those of 
the accusers are ignored. Second, it is an example of a fallacious argument from the lack of a 
legal finding of guilt to the conclusion that UBC lacks relevant knowledge to justify choosing a 
different speaker. The testimony of dozens of former students (some of which were given in 
                                                
46 DeRose (2009) and Ichikawa (2017) give extended sympathetic treatments of contextualism, including 
an emphasis on the connections between knowledge and action. Note also that even if contextualism is 
false in general, there is a strong case to be made that legal settings often invoke a distinctive sense of 
“knows”, according to which one “knows” only that which one is permitted to take on board for the 
purpose of the legal discussion. Thanks to Alex Guerrero here. 
47 http://president.ubc.ca/featured/2017/01/09/ubc-reinstates-john-furlong-as-keynote-speaker/ 
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sworn affidavits) did, in our view, put UBC officials in a position to know that Furlong was not a 
good choice of someone to venerate. 
This result, we think, is significant on its own—it refutes the deferential thought one hears every 
time one engages in public discourse about university sexual assault policies: “leave this 
criminal matter to law enforcement”. Even if we set aside the many problems with the way law 
enforcement is practiced, because criminal contexts tend to evoke high epistemic standards, 
their conclusions do not always bear directly on what counts as “known” in other contexts, like 
university ones. Since we know many things that haven’t been proven in court,48 the suggestion 
that we ought to act only on that which has been proven in court amounts to the suggestion that 
we ought to ignore many of the things we know. This is implausible in general; when it comes to 
e.g. ignoring the known fact that one’s student is a rapist, it is negligently harmful. 
Indeed, the argument is sometimes taken even further, to deny the appropriateness of individual 
actions in response to sexual assault allegations. Here is an anecdote illustrating the thought.49 
We recently observed a discussion about a call for papers for a philosophy workshop dedicated 
to the work of Professor Vine, an influential philosopher who had been accused of sexual 
misconduct by multiple former students and employees. Another philosopher, Alvin, saw the call 
for papers, and suggested that, in light of serious and credible allegations against Vine, 
academics should not submit papers for this workshop. But Wade, another academic, took 
exception to Alvin’s advice, arguing that the allegations against Vine, though serious, were 
unproven. Unless one had additional evidence, Wade said, beyond the detailed testimony that 
was then public, it would be irresponsible and unfair to Vine to take such an action as declining 
to submit to this workshop. 
As our discussion above should make clear, we have several points of disagreement with Wade 
in this story. For one thing, a detailed public allegation by a credible witness, as there was in this 
case, is in fact excellent evidence of wrongdoing. For another, Wade’s emphasis on the 
possible harms to Vine leave out a very important part of the story—Vine’s accusers are harmed 
by discounting or setting aside their testimony; participating in the workshop despite their 
testimony would have contributed to the normalization of sexual assault in professional 
philosophy. Third, Wade’s argument problematically assumes that suspending judgment on the 
allegations is the safe, “neutral” choice, and that taking a stance by refusing to submit to the 
workshop is an act of radicalism that requires a strong justification. But there is no clear reason 
why submitting to the workshop is the choice of default; indeed, in an intuitive sense, “not 
submitting a paper to a workshop” isn’t an action at all—it’s what one would do by default, 
absent some good enough reason to submit it. Assuming otherwise is an example of a harmful 
idealization in the sense of §4. 
Fourth, however, this case is also an illustration of the possible contextualist fallacy. In a context 
of a jury deliberation, perhaps “we cannot know whether these allegations are true” is true, 
                                                
48 One might say: since we count as “knowing” many things relative to the standards appropriate for the 
actions we are contemplating. 
49 Because the conversation recounted took place in a private forum, we use pseudonyms here. 
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because in that context, very strong epistemic standards are in effect; this simply does not imply 
that such sentences are true in more ordinary contexts, such as those operative in deciding 
whether to submit a paper to a workshop. To suppose otherwise is to assume that very high 
epistemic standards are always in effect, with the result that we “know” very little. Such 
skepticism is a recipe for inaction. 
So far we have not said much about how it is that epistemic standards are generated, beyond a 
gesture at the idea that when the stakes are higher, there is a tendency to employ stronger 
standards for “knows”. In §6, we foreground this question. We will suggest that there is an 
interesting connection between the ideas about rape culture mentioned in §1 and the 
metasemantic machinery of contextualism discussed in §5. 
§6 Epistemic Standards, Normativity, and Rape 
Culture 
Contextualism is a claim about the truth conditions of natural language sentences involving 
‘knows’. It is motivated, at least in part, by descriptive facts about the way ‘knows’ sentences are 
used, and it suggests that those uses amount to true ones. In this way, contextualism is 
conservative, rather than revolutionary. It is, in typical instances, motivated by a methodological 
commitment to preserving the truth of ordinary knowledge ascriptions.50 
Nevertheless, we think it’d be a mistake to suppose that contextualism supports any kind of 
complacency about knowledge ascriptions. On the contrary, the normative issues we began 
with about rape culture and biases towards the status quo interact deeply with contextualism 
and knowledge ascriptions, pointing to an undertheorized avenue for political engagement. In 
this final section, we explore those connections. The result will be an example of the sort of 
complex relationship between feminist epistemology and contextualism gestured at in Brister 
(2017), p. 58. 
We begin with two important metasemantic questions. First: can factors outside of individual 
speakers’ knowledge and control influence the epistemic standards they employ? And second: 
are there substantive normative questions about what epistemic standards one ought to 
employ? If the answer to the first question is yes, then it will be relatively easy for speakers to 
make false ‘knows’ claims, due to an incorrect assessment of their own standards. If the answer 
to the second question is yes, then, even if someone is saying something that is true, it might be 
that they ought to be speaking in a context where that sentence wouldn’t be true. Each of these 
possibilities corresponds to a kind of normative objectivity about knowledge ascriptions, pointing 
to ways in which whether one is proceeding properly may extend beyond the subject access. 
An example of objectivity of the first sort has been defended in a series of papers by 
Christopher Gauker.51 Gauker’s project emphasizes the mind-independence of contextual 
                                                
50 DeRose (2009) is particularly clear about this kind of motivation; see especially his pp. 56–9. 
51 See e.g. Gauker (2008) and Mion and Gauker (2017). 
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parameters, holding that, for example, whether a skeptical possibility is relevant depends more 
on the features of the situation at issue than on the speaker’s attention or intentions. On such a 
view, speakers might falsely believe that a certain skeptical worry is contextually relevant—this 
would lead to false ‘knowledge’ denials. For example, in a knowledge ascription involving 
testimony about sexual assault, one might hold that objective features of one’s situation imply a 
less skeptical epistemic standard, even if the speaker thinks a more stringent standard is 
operative. If so, individuals may face significant challenges in recognizing their own contextual 
situations; if one is unaware of the operation of these tacit contextual standards, one may be a 
very poor judge of knowledge ascriptions. Improved self-awareness, including awareness of 
one’s contextual situation, is crucial.52 This points to the structural nature of the problem: since 
rape culture isn’t under the immediate control of the individuals negatively affected by it or 
perpetrating it, the development of alternative hermeneutical resources for understanding and 
responding to sexual assault must involve a collective cultural effort, as well as the cultivation of 
certain epistemic virtues sensitive to particularities of context.53 
Even if one allows that speakers have considerable fiat over the relevant features of their 
conversational contexts, there is still room for a more objective assessment. Suppose for 
example that the context-sensitivity of ‘knows’ is largely a matter of something like David 
Lewis’s “Rule of Attention”, according to which whether an alternative is dependent on whether 
the speaker is thinking about it.54 As has often been observed, Lewis’s is a skeptic-friendly 
version of contextualism: if one is thinking about a skeptical scenario, and a subject’s evidence 
doesn’t rule that scenario out, then in one’s context, the subject can’t “know” that the scenario 
doesn’t obtain. For example, if a speaker is thinking about the possibility that a witness is lying, 
then, in the speaker’s context, no one will count as “knowing” the fact testified unless their 
evidence is sufficient to rule out a lie. On such a picture, speakers will have considerable control 
over the relevant features of their conversational contexts; compared to Gauker’s framework, 
we’d expect mistaken knowledge ascriptions to be rarer on a Lewisian story. 
But this doesn’t imply that there aren’t substantive normative questions about knowledge 
ascriptions. Truth or falsity of utterances isn’t the only thing we might be interested in evaluating. 
We may assume that subjects have the ability to implement whatever contextual parameters 
they like; that doesn’t mean there aren’t norms governing these conversational decisions. 
For one example of the kind of view we are thinking of, consider Sarah Moss’s (2018) 
discussion of belief in harmful stereotypes. Moss is interested in cases where statistical 
evidence seems to support a probabilistic claim that it’d be intuitively morally problematic to 
                                                
52 As a rough analogy, consider Miranda Fricker’s discussion of hermeneutical marginalization. Some 
aspects of some people’s experiences are particularly difficult some people to comprehend because they 
lack the necessary hermeneutical resources. This is not a failure that can be diagnosed ‘from the inside’; 
there is no simple recipe for detecting and avoiding it. Instead, one must develop a disposition of 
openness to experiences that are difficult for one to understand, recognizing that one’s hermeneutical 
resources are limited. 
53 This is one explanation for some of the value of consciousness-raising. See Kelland (2016). 
54 Lewis (1996), p. 559–60. The subject’s attention is one of several factors that influence relevance, in 
Lewis’s framework. 
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accept. To take one of Moss’s examples, suppose one knows on general statistical grounds that 
most of the women in a given office building are administrative assistants, and that one 
encounters a woman there, with no additional evidence relevant to her role. Moss wishes to 
deny that one can know on these grounds that she is probably an administrative assistant. To 
do this, she invokes a broadly Lewisian form of contextualism, along with what she calls the 
“Rule of Consideration”. This is a moral norm to the effect that “in many situations where you 
are forming beliefs about a person, you morally should keep in mind the possibility that they 
might be an exception to statistical generalizations.”55 The idea here is that one morally ought to 
be thinking about certain possibilities, such as the possibility that the woman one sees is a 
statistically unusual woman who is probably a manager, rather than an administrative assistant. 
And if one were thinking about such a possibility, it would count as relevant for the purpose of 
the knowledge ascription. If one flouts the Rule of Consideration, one might speak truly with an 
utterance ascribing “knows that she’s probably an administrative assistant” to someone in this 
situation. But Moss’s view is that one has a moral obligation not to flout the Rule of 
Consideration. If one ignores the possibility that this woman is exceptional, one has spoken 
truly, but behaved badly. 
This isn’t the venue to adjudicate the plausibility of Moss’s particular suggestion; we mention it 
as a vivid example of the ways in which moral considerations and contextual parameters can 
interact. There can be questions about what kinds of epistemic standards are appropriate.  
Moreover, most contextualists hold that speaking as if a given standard is in effect has a 
tendency of putting that standard into effect.56 So knowledge denials in debatable cases—such 
as testimony—will have a tendency of raising the standards for knowledge. An assertion to the 
effect that “there’s no way to know what really happened” can, if left unchallenged, lead to a 
more skeptical context where that sentence is true. Given the connections between knowledge 
ascriptions and action, such skeptical standards can have dramatic sociopolitical effects. 
For reasons much like these, Esa Diaz-Leon has recently suggested that, given contextualism, 
a knowledge ascription carries two important roles in a conversation. In addition to semantically 
expressing its content, it also conveys the pragmatic suggestion that the standard employed is 
the proper one. Diaz-Leon writes, about a disagreement between a Moorean who ascribes 
“knowledge” and a skeptic who denies “knowledge”, that: 
Moore and the skeptic (might) express compatible propositions at the semantic level, but 
they still express a genuine disagreement. In particular, their disagreement can be 
explained at the pragmatic level. That is, when the skeptic utters [a ‘knowledge’ denial], 
she is expressing the proposition that Moore does not satisfy certain (very high) 
standards of justification, whereas when Moore utters [a ‘knowledge’ ascription], he is 
expressing the proposition that he does satisfy certain lower standards of justification. 
These two propositions are compatible. But the skeptic is also conveying the information 
that “knows” should be used in a way so that one would count as knowing a proposition 
                                                
55 Moss (2018), §10.4. 
56  Lewis (1979) is the locus classicus. 
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only when one satisfies certain very high standards, whereas Moore is also conveying 
the information that “knows” should not be used in that way.57 
Diaz-Leon’s emphasis in her paper is to explain the sense of disagreement that persists in 
cases like these, where contextualism seems to allow that the speakers are asserting 
compatible truths. But her proposal here, with which we are sympathetic, offers an important 
framework for thinking about an additional political power of knowledge ascriptions, given 
contextualism. The flexibility of contextualism corresponds to a flexibility of which testimony to 
take seriously. 
An extreme example will make the connection vivid. Imagine a community that systematically 
employs high standards when talking about what women do or do not “know” and whether one 
can “know” on the basis of women’s testimony, and low standards when talking about the 
parallel issues for men. In this community, people will react to women’s descriptions of their 
experiences with utterances like, “people sometimes misinterpret other people’s actions, so 
although she thinks he was being sexist, she doesn’t know it”. But when men describe their 
experiences, skeptical possibilities don’t tend to come to mind, so people say things like “he 
knows what happened because he saw it himself.” And female testimony will be greeted with 
the skepticism that comes with high standards: “we can’t know unless we have some way to 
make sure she isn’t lying”, with no similar skepticism about male testimony. 
This is a thought experiment, though not, we think, a terribly far-fetched one. The point is to 
demonstrate that contextualism generates a dimension allowing the truth of utterances to come 
rather far apart from their normative aptness. Although there are many things deeply wrong with 
the misogynistic society posited, a tendency to make false knowledge ascriptions needn’t be 
one of them. The corollary is: one can object to assertions that reflect and contribute to rape 
culture without insisting that the contents of the assertions are false. One way assertions can 
contribute to rape culture is by managing epistemic standards in a way friendly to perpetrators 
of sexual assault. 
“He-said–she-said” discourse is a case in point. If a woman accuses a man of sexual assault, 
and he rebuts that there was sexual contact, but that it was consensual, this is literally a case in 
which “he said” one thing and “she said” something inconsistent. Pointing this out tends to have 
the conversational effect of inducing speakers to employ high epistemic standards, such that 
“we can’t know what really happened” will come out true. But that doesn’t mean we should 
modify the context in this way. If this is one of the many examples where “her” testimony is 
much more credible than “his”, it may well be that lower standards are appropriate, such that we 
can “know” that misconduct occurred. (This will be particularly plausible when informal action is 
being contemplated—i.e., decisions about whom to invite to a party, or whether to submit to a 
conference. These actions indicate what is acceptable in the context of shared social life, and 
do not hinge on a particular definition of relevant communities (for example, the state) or of the 
standards of that community (for example, proof beyond a reasonable doubt). 
                                                
57  Diaz-Leon (2017), p. 75. Diaz-Leon is applying to “knows” a strategy she attributes to Plunkett & 
Sundell (2013), who make a similar suggestion about moral evaluative language.  
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The ability to affect the conversational context in a particular way is a kind of social power. Not 
all parties to the disagreements Diaz-Leon describes are on equal footing. Like most social 
power, this ability is not distributed impartially; in a rape culture, those seeking to raise the 
standards governing sexual assault allegations will have the field tilted in their favour. So we 
agree with Evelyn Brister’s (2009) suggestion that it is helpful and informative to look to 
contextualism through a feminist lens, with an eye towards the deployment of social power. 
Brister emphasizes that, in a contextualist framework, “skepticism is a kind of power grab that 
puts other epistemic agents on the defensive and at a disadvantage. While some might believe 
that knowledge is power, the skeptic recognizes denying knowledge is power.” She continues: 
Recognizing the power dynamics of skeptical arguments allows us to examine the 
interests that philosophical skepticism serves. To begin with, philosophical skepticism 
distrusts all knowledge claims and avoids falsehood at the cost of dismissing possible 
truths: this represents a deeply conservative attitude toward the production of 
knowledge. For this reason, skepticism poses a special danger to novel claims that may 
already face a higher burden of proof and where skeptical objections may then prove 
decisive. In this way philosophical skepticism can exacerbate existing conditions of 
epistemic unfairness.58 
And: 
The skeptic would deny a collective responsibility for coordinated inquiry—and since all 
the institutions of scientific investigation, justice, and political accountability depend on 
decision making guided by knowledge claims, the skeptic's change of context undercuts 
our ability to act on the basis of justified beliefs.59 
We agree with both thoughts here. To Brister’s observations, we add that real-world skepticism 
isn’t a monolithic raising of standards, the way introductory epistemology courses sometimes 
imagine it is; it is a tool that is used selectively and strategically to promote entrenched interests. 
So the flexibility of knowledge ascriptions, given contextualism, comes along with significant 
social power. The decision to employ some standards rather than others is a political one. It 
shouldn’t be surprising, then, to suggest that this power tends to be wielded in a way that tends 
to protect the interests of the status quo. In general, social power tends to be used to reinforce 
itself. The case of contextualism is particularly interesting in this respect, due to its largely 
invisible operation. Notoriously, contextualism posits context-sensitivity in natural language 
about which many ordinary speakers are unaware. This is part of the reason why contextualism 
is a controversial thesis. Some epistemologists have rejected contextualism on the grounds that 
it is implausible that language could exhibit this kind of context-sensitivity without ordinary 
speakers’ recognizing it.60 We are sanguine about this “semantic ignorance” problem; we see no 
                                                
58 Brister (2009), p. 682. 
59 ibid p. 683. 
60 Schiffer 1996 was particularly influential along these lines. See also Hawthorne (2003), pp. 107–9 and 
Stanley (2005) pp. 115–20. Greenough and Kindermann (2017) give a contemporary overview of this kind 
of challenge, and offer a response on behalf of the contextualist. 
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particular tension in the idea that natural language exhibits surprising features ordinary 
speakers may be confused about. What we’d like to emphasize is that this confusion contributes 
to speakers’ ability to wield social power in an unreflective way. 
If one is unaware of the choice point of selecting an epistemic standard in a given situation, one 
may employ various biases, under a misapprehension of objectivity. If, for example, one has a 
natural tendency to favour the testimony of the socially powerful over that of marginalized 
people, one might, in a way similar to the society in our thought experiment above, employ 
higher standards in some cases than others, without realizing it. We think there’s good reason 
to suspect this is reasonably common.61 
In The Epistemology of Resistance, José Medina (2013) argues that structural inequality distorts 
epistemic relations between privileged people and oppressed people, resulting in a “numbness” 
among the privileged to injustices against the oppressed. As a consequence, the default 
epistemic positions of privileged communities and individuals are often oppressive ones. 
Applying this to our investigations here means that even without overt sexist biases or outright 
ill-will, it is possible to make knowledge ascriptions in a way that maintains and supports rape 
culture, and does violence to those who are attempting to be heard. (Indeed, “possible” here is 
an understatement. It’s what we should expect.) 
As we have argued, putatively “neutral” responses like suspending judgment or “doing nothing” 
can themselves be substantive contributions to, and reflections of, rape culture. This is true both 
because it normalizes bad behaviour, contributing to the general idea that it is acceptable, and, 
given contextualism, because it amounts to accommodating harmful conversational contexts. 
Indeed, contextualism is valuable in part because of the way it deals with skepticism, but 
attention to the ways in which it can be used as a conservative force is crucial to applying 
contextualism in an anti-oppressive way. Transparency regarding when harmful conversational 
contexts are being activated is itself a significant achievement for social justice. Following 
feminist standpoint theorists, we think marginalized individuals are typically situated best to 
know when this is occurring. 
Our project here has been in many ways a continuation of the critical work of feminist 
philosophers who argue that the “view from nowhere” is in fact often a view from a very 
particular and situated location. However, acknowledging how tendencies towards 
conservatism, risk aversion, and alignment with the status quo can have oppressive effects is 
not merely a critical endeavor. Indeed, though rape culture is a structural phenomenon, there 
are things that we can do collectively and as individuals to resist its negative epistemic effects. 
The implicit biases that motivate the reception of sexual assault narratives are not 
unchangeable. Moreover, we do hold people morally accountable for addressing such biases, 
                                                
61 This might be an alternate way of implementing some of Miranda Fricker’s ideas about testimonial 
injustice. Testimonial injustice is a “credibility deficit owing to identity prejudice in the hearer” (Fricker 
2007, p. 28). A credibility deficit is naturally thought of as a lower-than-deserved confidence in one’s 
credibility. An alternate proposal, inspired by our remarks above, might characterize the inappropriate 
invocation of high epistemic standards as a kind of credibility deficit. Perhaps one can commit an 
epistemic injustice, not by having too low an opinion of someone’s credibility, but by setting too high a bar 
for accepting their word. 
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as well as their active, motivated epistemic ignorance regarding certain politically loaded 
concepts or identities.62 Consciousness-raising is also invaluable as both a means of 
introducing new hermeneutical resources into the public eye, and a way for individuals to come 
to recognize their own contexts. Feminist theorizing of the second-wave—the heyday of 
consciousness-raising—tells us that “the personal is political.” Accounting for this at the level of 
epistemic theory has been part of our project here.63 
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